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ABSTRACT 
It is understood that the mass media are a pervasive force in shaping the public’s perceptions. 
This paper incorporates agenda-setting theory to explore whether and to what extent that the 
mass media can signal business failure. In an analysis of news coverage relating to Chinese 
underperforming listed firms over the period 2006-2017, it is demonstrated that firms whose 
stocks are put under “special treatment” status due to consecutive annual losses experience 
(*ST) greater news volume and lower news sentiment relative to other firms in the quarter in 
which the “delisting risk warning” announcements are made. Furthermore, *ST firms which 
are eventually delisted have a greater volume of news than other *ST firms, but we find no 
evidence that the sentiment of news relates to termination of listing. Our findings offer 
insights into the informativeness of the mass media and their agenda-setting effects in the 
business failure context.  
Key words: mass media; media exposure; business failure; agenda-setting; delisting; 
sentiment analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars in the field of communication have long recognised the mass media’s socio-
economic imperative, which exerts widespread influence on individuals and society. For 
example, media attentiveness to policy issues offers the public accessible information about 
the political environment and activities. While the media framing may not be able to change 
individual opinions about a certain issue, it has an impact on their perception of the collective 
salience of the issue and the dominant view which prevails within their communities (Mutz & 
Soss, 1997). In addition to acting as an agent which reports reality, the mass media are one of 
the information systems that are involved in shaping opinions and affecting people’s 
behaviour and social actions (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Through editorials and feature articles, the mass media set the agenda for the public by telling 
people what issues to think about, and more importantly, how to think about these issues 
(Carroll & McCombs, 2003).  
In the business field, the mass media also play a critical role. Prior studies have discovered 
that media disclosures and narratives may affect stock returns (e.g. Fang & Peress, 2009), 
corporate reputation (e.g. Carroll & McCombs, 2003; Wartick, 1992), corporate social 
responsibility (e.g. Grafström & Windell, 2011; Zyglidopoulos, Georgiadis, Carroll, & Siegel, 
2012) and the survival of an organisation in field-wide crisis (e.g. Desai, 2011). Extensive 
media coverage of particular firms, issues, or events implies a prominence in the public 
agenda which is likely to influence stakeholders’ and the public’s impressions of firms 
(Pollock & Rindova 2003). Moreover, given the presence of information asymmetry, 
stakeholders and onlookers largely rely on information intermediaries to make inferences and 
assessments about a firm and its status (Deephouse, 2000). The market will not react to 
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business events such as bankruptcy until relevant information is widely disseminated by 
major news media (Dawkins & Bamber, 1998). 
For decades, scholars have been studying the antecedents and consequences of business 
failure. Yet the existing literature in organisational research has documented limited evidence 
regarding the role of the mass media in business failure. Prior studies tend to explore media 
views on failure causes (e.g. Johnson, 2000) and how firms react to failure by influencing 
media exposure (e.g. Desai, 2011; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012), but there is 
little discussion on how the behaviour of information intermediaries such as the mass media 
potentially reflect and connect with business failure events. Given the increasing attention on 
the mass media in the business arena, this study aims to address this lacuna in our 
understanding by exploring the role of the mass media in business failure events. We are 
particularly interested in media visibility and news sentiment of underperforming firms in the 
Chinese stock market1. 
The reason for our focus on the Chinese stock market is mainly because of its unique 
regulatory environment which provides a natural setting for testing media effects. Since the 
establishment of the Chinese stock market, various laws and regulations have been 
implemented in order to protect the interests of investors. Among them, the Rules Governing 
the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange (2014) and the Rules Governing the 
Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock Exchange (2014) both contain a provision called 
“special treatment”. For example, the relevant provision in Rules Governing the Listing of 
Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange (2014) states that the stock exchange will issue a 
“special treatment” in the form of a delisting risk warning (DRW) regarding the stocks of a 
                                                 
1 In the management field, media visibility is often referred to as media attention (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012). In 
this study, we follow this definition and use the term “media visibility” to denote the quantity and intensity of 
media coverage of a firm. 
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listed firm which has suffered two consecutive annual losses.2 The DRW entails “putting a 
*ST before the short name of a stock to make a distinction from other stocks and imposing a 
five percent daily up and down limit” (Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, 2014, Chapter XIII, Section 1). In addition, a firm needs to announce the 
DRW on the trading day immediately preceding the date on which the DRW will be issued in 
relation to its stocks. The “special treatment” policy is used to highlight the risk represented 
by underperforming listed firms and to restrict trading in their stocks. Firms under the status 
of “special treatment” (*ST firms) with a further loss in the third fiscal-year will be 
suspended from listing and those firms that are still in the red in the fourth year will be 
terminated from listing. This policy is almost exclusive to the Chinese stock market (Jiang & 
Wang, 2008). In relation to this, we are able to test the informativeness of the mass media at 
the time of ST events and identify the differential impact of media exposure on delisted *ST 
firms as compared to that on non-delisted *ST firms. 
This paper first contributes to the organisational study regarding business failure with an 
empirical analysis of how the mass media relate to firms’ underperformance. Specifically, we 
examine underperforming firms’ media exposure in terms of visibility and sentiment and how 
such media exposure relates to termination of listing. Through the theoretical development 
and empirical analysis, we provide a clearer picture of the role that the mass media play in the 
business failure context, which responds to the call for the investigation of the 
interdependency between firms and the mass media (Carroll & McCombs, 2003). Next, 
moving beyond using media narratives to identify failure causes (e.g. Johnson, 2000; Cardon, 
                                                 
2 A special treatment may be either a DRW (putting a *ST before the short name of stocks) or other kinds of 
special treatment (putting an ST before the short name of stocks). The occurrence of consecutive annual losses 
is the dominating cause for special treatment (Jiang & Wang, 2008). In addition, stocks of firms could also be 
put into ST or *ST status upon the occurrence of other circumstances. See Rules Governing the Listing of 
Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2014, Chapter XIII, Section 2. In this study, the issuance of special 
treatment is referred to as “ST event” and we use the term “*ST firms” to denote firms whose stocks are under 
special treatment due to consecutive annual losses.  
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Stevens, & Potter; 2011; Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & Vaara, 2013), our study adopts a 
sentiment analysis approach to investigate business news. Opinion mining enables us to 
detect the media sentimental orientations and also attitudes towards business events and thus 
explore their potential relation to business failure. In addition, we extend the strand of 
communication research by testing for agenda-setting relationships between the media and 
business failure. Our results indicate that the mass media form investors’ perceived severity 
of firms’ underperformance by selecting which firms to cover, but we find no evidence that 
the way the mass media frame the story relates to the survival of underperforming firms. The 
insights from this study advance our understanding of media exposure and agenda-setting in 
the business sphere.  
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. We first provide an overview of related 
literature on business failure and media exposure, based on which we develop our hypotheses. 
Data collection and the sentiment analysis approach are then presented, followed by results 
and discussions. The last section concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 A Retrospective of Business Failure 
In the current literature, business failure has been defined and operationalised in various ways. 
According to Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett and Lyon (2013), the scope varies from being 
narrow, only covering bankruptcy, to broad, encompassing discontinuance of the business 
and discontinuance of ownership. While the bankruptcy view emphasises a firm’s poor 
economic performance (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011), the discontinuance of business highlights 
cessation of operations and loss of identity (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Besides these, a 
broader definition views business failure as the discontinuance of ownership (Watson & 
Everett, 1996; Everett & Watson, 1998). This focuses on the exit of entrepreneurs who close 
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or sell the company due to insolvency (Shepherd, 2003), underperforming against owner’s 
expectations (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & Flores, 
2010) or personal reasons (e.g. retirement, health concerns, wishing to move on to another 
business or career opportunity).  
In addition to business closure, a nuanced perspective on business failure considers the 
underperforming survival firms (Khelil, 2016). Such firms experience a downturn in business 
performance yet persist over a long period (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). Persistently 
underperforming firms may have greater destructive effects on resources allocation and 
utilisation than insolvent ones that exit the market and this may lead to damaging impacts on 
the economy (Baumol, 1996; DeTienne, Shepherd, & De Castro, 2008; Khelil, 2016). 
However, some entrepreneurs decide to continue a business despite the fact that the business 
falls short of expectations or thresholds for economic viability. Such persistence in 
underperforming firms and, on the opposite extreme, the dissolving or offloading of a 
business even when it is performing well, can be partly attributed to “entrepreneur’s 
motivation, commitment and aspiration” (Khelil, 2016, pp.75). Explanations of business 
failure at the individual level focus on psychological factors, in particular the disappointment 
or lack of satisfaction elicited by gaps between actual performance and expectations (Cooper 
& Artz, 1995). 
Going beyond the emotive approach, research on the antecedents of business failure has seen 
a clear divide between the voluntarist and the determinist perspectives (Khelil, 2016). The 
voluntarist perspective attributes failure to factors at the firm level. This approach, relying on 
the resource-based view and the upper-echelon perspective (see Amankwah-Amoah, 2016), 
suggests that the fundamental causes of failure are manager’s perceptions, decisions and 
actions (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). It argues that failure is a result of top management poor 
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performance, inaction and/or deficiencies in managerial resources, rather than the 
institutional and industrial constraints that all firms in the marketplace are confronted with. In 
sharp contrast, the determinist perspective posits a vital role for the external environment. 
This tranche of research assumes that organisations’ leaders have little or no control over 
exogenous factors (Moulton, Thomas & Pruett, 1996) in the changing environment. 
Nevertheless, recent studies have recognised that these two polarised views in isolation offer 
limited explanation for business failure which calls for an integrative approach (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004). In this study, we follow an integrative view and a broader definition of 
business failure that covers underperforming organisations.  
2.2 Mass Media Agenda-Setting 
The mass media means, essentially, “any communication channel used to simultaneously 
reach a large number of people, including radio, TV, newspapers, magazines, billboards, 
films, recordings, books, the internet and smart media” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013, pp.2). 
Mass communication researchers have concluded that the mass media have a significant 
influence on people through changing, reinforcing, or shaping their attitudes and behaviours 
(see e.g. Macnamara, 2003; Hindle & Klyver, 2007). These three schools of thought on 
media effects differentiate in terms of the power of the media in influencing audiences’ 
behaviour and thinking. The bullet theory (Schramm, 1954), also known as the hypodermic-
needle theory (Berlo, 1960) and the stimulus-response theory (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 
1982), emphasises that media institutions are very powerful and directly influence and 
change people’s attitudes. On the contrary, the reinforcement theory (Klapper, 1960) 
disagrees concerning the media’s social control and contends that the media have a very 
limited ability to change people’s beliefs but can reinforce existing opinions and ideas. A 
third paradigm is a middle-of-the-road perspective which is known as the mass media 
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agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993).  This view advocates that media 
have no direct impact on people’s views, but are able to shape people’s perceptions and 
values rather than change them. The media “create public awareness and concern for certain 
issues” (Carroll, 2004, pp.10), and this is capable of influencing the salience of topics on the 
public agenda (Carroll & McCombs, 2003; McCombs, 2014). 
There are three dimensions of media salience identified in the communication literature: 
attention, prominence and valence (Kiousis, 2004). Attention refers to the high visibility of an 
event or an entity in the media which is manifest in extensive reports or a considerable 
amount of space taken up (Carroll, 2004). Prominence is concerned with the placement and 
position of such news, such as front-page stories, news released by elite newspapers, size of 
the headline and length of a report. These two dimensions focus on the salience of issues, i.e., 
the central topics in news coverage which are also known as media objects (Carroll & 
McCombs, 2003). The third dimension, valence, is concerned with the effects of the affective 
attributes of news on media salience. It captures the emotional context, such as a positive or 
negative tone, and the tenor of description (Carroll, 2004; Kiousis, 2004).  
2.3 Mass Media and Business Failure 
Prior studies have already shifted attention towards media coverage in relation to 
understanding business performance. In the financial realm, media can influence the market 
by framing market events and this may facilitate the appearance of “irrational exuberance” 
(Shiller, 2015). Fang and Peress (2009) find that intense media coverage of stocks leads to a 
lower return. Similarly, Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) examine the relationship between 
mutual fund performance and media coverage and contend that the mass media affect the 
behaviour of professional investors. Indeed, the mass media as key disseminators of 
information reduce information asymmetry for the public (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), and 
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exert a great deal of influence on the construction of organisational identity (Gilpin, 2008) as 
well as on stakeholders’ perceptions and behaviour (Einwiller, Carroll, & Korn, 2010).  
It is not until recent years that studies on business failure sense-making start to focus on news 
content (Mantere et al., 2013). Through analysing the media narratives of chain store closing 
down events, Johnson (2000) finds that media frames are mainly operationalised to delineate 
attributions of causal responsibility with a tendency to emphasise internal reasons inherent in 
the organisation. This is in contrast to corporate reports which generally accentuate 
uncontrollable external forces. Williams (2013) suggests that press coverage particularly with 
the use of metaphor significantly affects investment decision making. By examining the tenor 
of the media coverage of toy companies after wrongdoing, Zavyalova et al. (2012) document 
a negative spillover effect that media sentiment of a focal firm is affected by the behaviour of 
other firms in the same industry. Taken together, the framing of stories on media may lead to 
distinct interpretations and views on managerial capabilities and activities (Vaara, 2002), and 
so appropriate information and communication might be a decisive factor in business survival 
(Frankowiak, 1992).  
The primary research question addressed by this study is whether and to what extent media 
exposure relate to business failure. We first investigate the association between media 
visibility, measured as volume of news, and underperforming firms. On the one hand, the 
media tend to be selective about what to report, known as the media’s gatekeeping bias, 
which is often driven by the media’s self-interest in attracting readers (D'Alessio & Allen, 
2000; Boyle & Hoeschen, 2001). In this sense, media visibility in the financial market tends 
to be a reflection of the audiences’ focus on key events. Firms that are of interest to investors 
are more likely to be covered by the press (Miller, 2006). Particularly, the media tend to pay 
attention to firms with nonconforming behaviours (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Li, 
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Ramesh, and Shen (2011) find that firms reporting losses or in the process of delisting are 
more likely to receive alerts from Dow Jones Newswires. As underperformance indicates a 
higher risk for market participants (Baumol, 1996; DeTienne et al., 2008; Khelil, 2016), 
underperforming firms may attract greater media attention than other firms. On the other 
hand, adverse effects may be introduced by intense media scrutiny which puts the 
underperforming firms in the public spotlight and thus restricts firm actions. As illustrated in 
previous discussions on mass media agenda-setting, attention and prominence contribute to 
media salience regarding a topic, and the sheer amount of news coverage serves as an 
information cue to the audiences about the relative importance of the topic in the media 
agenda. The news media, as information intermediaries, monitor firms’ malfeasances (Miller, 
2006), and widespread media exposure raises public attention and awareness of firms’ 
underperformance. Facing the aforementioned delisting mechanism in the Chinese stock 
market, listed firms have strong incentives to manage their earnings so as to report a profit 
(Liu & Lu, 2007). Since earnings management is constrained by scrutiny from information 
intermediary agents (Yu, 2008), extensive media coverage may lead to greater scrutiny of 
earnings management for *ST firms and thus increase their costs of meeting earnings targets. 
Hence, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The news visibility (volume) of *ST firms is greater than that of non-*ST 
listed firms in the quarter in which the DRW announcement is made. 
Hypothesis 1b: *ST firms with greater news visibility (volume) in the quarter in which the 
DRW announcement is made are more likely to be terminated from listing.  
Another important element in media salience is valence. The media, as suggested in Cardon 
et al. (2011), may recount a firm’s actions in a more accurate and comprehensive way than 
does the firm itself, and thus depict a community-based view of reality. The disclosure of 
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business information via news media provides the public and stakeholders with cues from 
which to make inferences about the attributions of past events, the present status and future 
developments. Media frames tend to explore aspects inherent in the organisation rather than 
uncontrollable external factors (Johnson, 2000). In contrast to corporate accounts (e.g. annual 
reports) controlled by stakeholder groups which may frame news in their own interests or in 
that of the communities they serve (Hunter, Van Wassenhove, Besiou, & Van Halderen, 
2013), investigations by the mass media are expected to be more “neutral” and “un-
interventional”. For firms that experience operational difficulties and managerial problems, 
the tone of the news can be expected to be negative if the news is a factual account.  
In addition, communications via news media not only recount the stories but also convey 
feelings which are reflected in the tone or disposition of presentations (MacKuen & Coombs, 
1981; McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). According to the agenda-setting theory discussed 
previously, the mass media exert an influence on people’s understanding of the topic salience 
via texts, statements and rhetoric. The tone of the mass media makes a significant impact on 
the perceived severity of a firm’s underperformance and on the perceived probability of its 
survival. A strong tone may lead to either overly optimistic or pessimistic views being held 
by stakeholders concerning a firm. Besides, opinions on the current performance of a firm 
expressed in news discourses carry meanings to audiences and can shape their interpretations 
of the information signals regarding the firm’s prospects. Such perceptions and impressions 
created by the mass media may shape market sentiment, opinions and/or beliefs, which 
further affect stakeholders’ decision making. Moreover, negative information is perceived as 
more reliable than positive information and investors react more strongly to negative news 
than to positive news (Epstein & Echneider, 2008). Unfavourable media accounts of an 
underperforming firm may leave a negative impression with stakeholders, leading to a loss of 
current and potential investors. Taken together, we predict that underperforming firms with 
 12 
unfavourable media accounts are more likely to experience negative outcomes such as 
termination of listing. The hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: The news sentiment of *ST firms is more negative than that of non-*ST 
listed firms in the quarter in which the DRW announcement is made. 
Hypothesis 2b: *ST firms with more negative news sentiment in the quarter in which the 
DRW announcement is made are more likely to be terminated from listing. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data and Sample 
To investigate the association between media exposure and business failure, we focus on 
news related to listed firms in the Chinese stock market. As stated before, the reason we 
choose the Chinese stock market is that it provides us with an opportunity to compare media 
exposure among delisted firms, underperforming firms, and other firms. We start with news 
of A-share listed firms as issued by the Chinese press, including major newspapers, 
magazines, and websites, extracted from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database over the period from January 2006 to March 20173. We extract the title, 
date, author, content, and source of news items released in our sample period from CSMAR 
and then match it to each listed firm based on a separately constructed dataset containing the 
linkage between listed firms and news. Next, we manually eliminate declarative news without 
evaluation, including firm disclosures and announcements. News issued by brokerage firms, 
banks, investment consulting firms and other institutional investors are also removed since 
their incentives may be misaligned with those of other market participants (see, e.g. 
                                                 
3 The data on the linkage between news and listed firms start from 1997 but the coverage of the fiscal year 2005 
is significantly insufficient (less than 10 per cent) compared to those of other fiscal years. Consequently, we are 
unable to link the news, as well as the sentiment, to listed firms. Thus, the sample period for this study is 2006 
to mid-2017. 
 13 
Bradshaw, 2011). Then we exclude news associated with more than one firm as we are 
unable to discern and process specific content for each related firm. The initial sample 
contains 215,944 pieces of news for 49,358 firm-quarters over our sample period. It is 
important to note that we require at least two pieces of news to calculate the average 
sentiment for each firm-quarter, which leads to a further loss of 16,267 items of news. We 
also obtain firms’ financial information from CSMAR and the Wind Financial Database and 
delete 993 firm-quarter observations with missing values. The final sample comprises 
194,293 items of news for 32,091 firm-quarters (2,722 listed firms). The line chart in Figure 
1 presents the quarterly distribution of listed firms, and the bar chart shows the quarterly 
distribution of news related to listed firms.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
We collect the announcement date of DRW from CSMAR and cross-check this with several 
other financial information sources including Cninfo (the official information disclosure 
platform of the Chinese stock exchanges), p5w.net, and the Wind Financial Database. We 
only include DRW announcements due to poor performance (i.e. two consecutive fiscal-year 
losses) in order to avoid noise. During the sample period, there are 594 such announcements 
issued by 445 listed firms. We match the DRW data to our sample of news items based on the 
stock ID and announcement time. 333 announcements by 280 firms are matched to our 
sample. As shown in Figure 2, most DRW announcements are made in the second quarter 
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which is consistent with the time limit for the release of periodic reports in the Chinese stock 
market.4  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
3.2 Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment analysis is a text mining technique which uses computational algorithms to extract 
and classify subjective and emotional information contained in text documents (Pang & Lee, 
2004, 2008). We adopt a Support Vector Machine (SVM) machine learning approach to build 
a text classifier based on a set of manually labelled training documents (Pang, Lee, & 
Vaithyanathan, 2002) and then apply this to the unlabelled news items to identify their 
sentiment. SVM is widely used in text categorisation, and is highly effective and outperforms 
other classifiers (Pang, Lee, & Vaithyanathan, 2002). In particular, Tan and Zhang (2008) 
show that SVM performs the best in relation to Chinese sentiment analysis.  
To train the classifier, the first step is to reduce the document complexity and transform the 
unstructured text data into a format available for machine learning and statistical analysis. We 
first segment the Chinese words using the Rwordseg package in R software and split the text 
of a document into a sequence of tokens describing the content (Feldman & Sanger 2007). 
Common Chinese stopwords are removed from the documents in order to reduce noise. To 
construct a training set for the SVM learner, we randomly select 300 pieces of news from our 
sample and manually assign labels of positive or negative to each item of news. This 
classification yields 190 positive and 110 negative news items for the training dataset. We 
                                                 
4 The Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014) mandates that listed firms should disclose their 
annual reports within four months after the end of a fiscal year.  
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then tune the SVM algorithm on the training set and conduct a ten-fold cross-validation to 
evaluate classification performance. The confusion matrix in Table 1 shows the correct 
classifications and the error types. Overall, the SVM classifier achieves an accuracy of 
79.67%, a precision of 78.67%, a recall of 93.16%, and an F-measure of 85.30%5.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
The trained classifier is then applied to our sample and each piece of news is labelled as 
positive or negative with a confidence score ranging from zero to one. We extract the 
confidence score of the positive class as a proxy for the sentiment of documents. A higher 
score towards one means the news has a greater probability of conveying positive and 
favourable information, whereas a number closer to zero shows the news is more likely to 
have a negative and unfavourable tone.  
3.3 Measures and Model Specifications 
To examine the informativeness of the mass media, we first focus on news visibility 
(LnNewsVolume), measured as the natural logarithm of the number of news items for firm i in 
quarter q. Next, we examine the average sentiment of news (NewsSentiment), which is given 
by the average sentiment score of all news items related to firm i in quarter q. *ST and 
Delisting are categorical variables, respectively indicating whether firm i has been issued a 
DRW and whether firm i is delisted afterwards due to continuous underperformance. We also 
control for firm-specific characteristics that may be associated with media exposure, 
including: logarithm of total assets (Size), return on equity (ROE), leverage (Leverage), and 
                                                 
5 We also train a Naïve Bayes classifier and compare its performance to the SVM classifier. The results show 
that the SVM classifier outperforms the Naïve Bayes classifier. 
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earnings per share (EPS). All control variables are one quarter lagged and measured at the 
end of quarter q-1. We first estimate model [1] and [2] to examine the informativeness of the 
press in the context of ST events: 
𝐿𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑞 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 × ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑖 +  𝛾 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑞−1 +  𝜀                      [1] 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑞 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 × ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑖 +  𝛾 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑞−1 +  𝜀                      [2] 
Additionally, to further examine the role of the media in the context of firm delisting events, 
we restrict our sample to firm-quarters with ST events. Among the 280 firms within the sub-
sample, 5 are delisted afterwards. We deploy model [3] to see whether and to what extent the 
media can signal the delisting of *ST firms: 
Pr(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1  ×  𝐿𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽2  ×  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑞 +
 𝛾 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑞−1 +  𝜀                                                                         [3] 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 2. Overall, about 1 percent of our firm-
quarter observations contain ST events and observations of delisted firms only account for 
0.56 percent of the whole sample. The average sentiment has a mean value of 0.637. All 
control variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions to 
mitigate the potential influence of outliers. To test our hypotheses, we first conduct a two-
sample t-test. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, we compare the news volume and the average 
news sentiment between *ST and non-*ST firms. The results indicate higher news volume 
and lower news sentiment for *ST firms (both significant at the 0.01 level). This is in line 
with our speculation that *ST firms attract greater media attention and have lower news 
sentiment as compared to non-*ST firms. Likewise, we find some supporting evidence for 
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such differences existing between delisted and non-delisted *ST firms (Table 3, Panel B). 
*ST firms that are eventually delisted obtain greater media exposure in the quarter of the 
DRW announcement. The difference in news sentiment between these two groups of firms at 
the time of the DRW announcement is marginally significant. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
We next perform OLS regressions to investigate the relationship between media exposure and 
*ST status. Table 4 presents the estimation results for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a. We 
find strong effects of *ST status on news volume and sentiment (p < 0.001). The positive 
coefficient on *ST status in column 1 suggests that on average *ST firms have 27.4% more 
news coverage than non-*ST listed firms in the quarter of the DRW announcement. Besides, 
as shown in column 2, news sentiment is on average 0.051 lower among *ST firms as 
compared to other listed firms. These results provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1a 
and Hypothesis 2a, which are concerned with media informativeness around the time of 
DRW announcement. The media in this case play an informative role in identifying focus 
events and disclosing value relevant information to the public. This is manifest in the 
increased volume of news and the more negative tone expressed in the news regarding *ST 
firms. This is also suggestive of the media agenda-setting role in swaying audiences’ 
attention and influencing the perceived salience of firm underperformance through extensive 
news coverage and stronger sentiment.  
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------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
Next, we focus on the delisted firms within the *ST group. To test Hypothesis 1b and 
Hypothesis 2b, we regress an indicator of termination of listing on news volume and news 
sentiment and a vector of control variables. The results are presented in Table 5. Consistent 
with our expectation, the volume of news is significantly and positively associated with the 
delisting of a firm (p = 0.030 and p = 0.038 in column 1 and 3 respectively), suggesting that 
delisted firms have greater media visibility in the quarter in which the DRW announcement is 
made. As previously discussed, *ST firms that are delisted afterwards may experience severer 
business difficulties than other *ST firms at the time of their DRW announcements and are 
thus more likely to attract media attention. Additionally, from a perspective of impression 
management, firms may leverage information intermediaries in order to develop intangible 
assets (Zavyalova et al., 2012). As such, firms facing severer difficulties may deliberately 
manage their media visibility in order to redeem their image in the perceptions of 
stakeholders, leading to an increase in media coverage. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
Next, as evident in column (2) and (3) of Table 5, the results do not document a significant 
association between the news sentiment of *ST firms and the probability of delisting (p = 
0.260 and p = 0.289 in column 2 and 3 respectively). This is different from our presumption 
that news sentiment is lower for delisted firms in the quarter in which their DRW 
announcements are made, compared to that of surviving firms. A possible explanation for the 
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reduced sensitivity of media sentiment in the delisting events is that the media are 
intermediaries for disseminating information and their analytical skills, comprehensiveness of 
investigation, personal inclination, and familiarity with *ST firms vary considerably, leading 
to mixed sentiment in the news. Another concern is that, as discussed previously, 
underperforming firms may engage in impression management in order to be positively 
perceived by market participants and attract potential investors. Prior studies (e.g. 
Hooghiemstra, 2000) have long recognised the importance of impression management in 
improving a firm’s reputation and the perceptions of its investors. In addition to corporate 
accounts, underperforming firms or relevant parties may try to influence and even manipulate 
media accounts, resulting in increased media sentiment and therefore mixed results.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper contributes to the organisational study by exploring the effects of media exposure 
on business failure. We attempt to answer the question of whether and to what extent the 
mass media relate to business failure. By comparing the media exposure of Chinese *ST 
listed firms in terms of visibility, we show that *ST firms have greater news volume in the 
quarter of the DRW announcement. Similarly, the news visibility of *ST firms that are 
eventually delisted is higher than that of other *ST firms. These findings indicate that *ST 
status and the probability of delisting are strongly related to news volume which confirms our 
hypotheses about the association of media visibility with firms’ underperformance and 
terminations of listing. The mass media perform the function of an information intermediary 
by focusing on enterprises in distress and shifting public attention onto them. In addition, 
there is mixed evidence regarding the relationship between news sentiment and *ST status. 
Consistent with prior evidence (e.g. Li et al., 2011) on the information intermediary role of 
the media, we find that news sentiment is significantly unfavourable to *ST firms compared 
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to non-*ST firms. However, there is no significant difference in news sentiment between 
delisted *ST firms and other *ST firms. The reduced sensitivity could be reflective of 
underperforming firms’ impression management incentives.  
Our findings shed light on the informativeness of the mass media in relation to firm 
underperformance and delisting events and add to our knowledge about the agenda-setting 
function of the mass media in the context of business failure. However, our study is subject to 
several limitations. First, our analysis is restricted to the major news media in mainland China, 
and therefore generalising results by including social media could usefully be undertaken. 
Second, our results regarding the effect of news sentiment on delisted firms are based on a 
small sample, and should thus be interpreted with caution. Finally, it might be interesting for 
future studies to explore firms’ active management of media exposure in the business failure 
context. Extending this study to the additional examination of firm-media interdependency 
would help further investigate media objectivity in providing value-relevant information.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. SVM Classifier Performance 
 True positive True negative 
Predicted positive 177 48 
Predicted negative 13 62 
Accuracy 79.67%  
Precision (Positive predictive value) 78.67% 
Recall (True positive rate) 93.16% 
F1 score  85.30% 
Note: We use four commonly adopted measures of classification performance (see Netzer, 
Feldman, Goldenberg, & Fresko, 2012). Accuracy is measured as the percentage of correct 
predictions over the total number of documents. Precision is the proportion of extracted 
documents that are classified correctly. Recall is the proportion of documents that are extracted 
and classified correctly. F1 score is the harmonic mean of recall and precision, given by F = 2 * 
Precision * Recall / (Precision + Recall).    
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variables N M SD p25 p50 p75 
Variables of interest 
LnNewsVolume 32091 1.453 0.719 0.693 1.386 1.946 
NewsSentiment 32091 0.637 0.101 0.580 0.653 0.710 
Delisting 32091 0.006 0.075 0 0 0 
*ST 32091 0.010 0.101 0 0 0 
Control variables 
Size 32091 21.720 1.360 20.820 21.590 22.420 
ROE 32091 0.045 0.136 0.011 0.040 0.087 
Leverage 32091 0.512 0.309 0.310 0.492 0.658 
EPS 32091 0.225 0.395 0.023 0.131 0.337 
Notes: All control variables are one quarter lagged and measured at the end of quarter q-1. 
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Table 3. T-test Results 
PANEL A: Firms without *ST (ST = 0) and with *ST (ST = 1) 
 *ST = 0 *ST = 1 T-test 
Variables M SD M SD t-value p-value 
LnNewsVolume 1.449     0.717     1.769     0.815     -8.087 0.000 
NewsSentiment 0.638     0.101     0.525     0.098     20.461 0.000 
Size 21.732     1.357     20.756     1.211     13.071 0.000 
ROE 0.046      0.133    -0.039     0.292   11.447 0.000 
Leverage 0.508 0.304     0.899 0.501 -23.163 0.000 
EPS 0.229 0.395 -0.150 0.273 17.470 0.000 
PANEL B: Non-delisted *ST Firms (Delisted = 0) and delisted *ST Firms (Delisted = 1) 
 Delisted = 0 Delisted = 1 T-test 
Variables M SD M SD t-value p-value 
LnNewsVolume 1.753 0.806 2.654 0.880 -2.711 0.007 
NewsSentiment 0.526 0.097 0.460 0.130 1.650 0.100 
Size 20.752 1.205 20.970 1.644 -0.436 0.663 
ROE 0.038 0.292 -0.088 0.318 0.414 0.679 
Leverage 0.900 0.499 0.902 0.676 -0.017 0.986 
EPS -0.148 0.272 -0.245 0.349 0.861 0.390 
Notes: All control variables are one quarter lagged and measured at the end of quarter q-1. 
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Table 4. Regression Analysis on Media Exposure and ST Events 
 (1) (2) 
 LnNewsVolume NewsSentiment 
*ST 0.274*** 
[0.042] 
-0.051*** 
[0.005] 
Size 0.000 
[0.011] 
0.014*** 
[0.001] 
ROE -0.045 
[0.045] 
0.016*** 
[0.006] 
Leverage 0.154*** 
[0.031] 
-0.036*** 
[0.005] 
EPS 0.002 
[0.020] 
0.030*** 
[0.003] 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes 
Quarter-fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 32091 32091 
R2 0.343 0.372 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the association between media 
exposure and *ST status. The dependent variable in regression (1) is the logarithm of news volume 
and the dependent variable in regression (2) is news sentiment. Firm and Quarter fixed effects are 
included. All control variables are one quarter lagged and we report the p-values based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. Standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.1, p 
< 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.  
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Table 5. Regression Analysis on Media Exposure and Delisting 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Delisting Delisting Delisting 
LnNewsVolume 0.375** 
[0.173] 
 
 
0.354** 
[0.170] 
NewsSentiment  
 
-2.668 
[2.367] 
-2.561 
[2.414] 
Size 0.012 
[0.161] 
0.054 
[0.149] 
0.047 
[0.162] 
ROE -0.106 
[0.391] 
-0.196 
[0.377] 
-0.216 
[0.399] 
Leverage -0.108 
[0.392] 
0.016 
[0.375] 
-0.072 
[0.379] 
EPS -0.502 
[0.388] 
-0.514 
[0.397] 
-0.460 
[0.379] 
N 333 333 333 
pseudo R2 0.084 0.063 0.120 
Notes: This table reports the results of probit regressions examining the association between media 
exposure and the probability of delisting. The dependent variable is an indicator of delisting, which 
equals 1 if a *ST firm is delisted afterwards and 0 otherwise. All control variables are one quarter 
lagged and we report the p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Standard errors 
are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Quarterly Distribution of News and Listed Firms 
 
Figure 2. Quarterly Distribution of Announcements of Delisting Risk and Special Treatment 
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